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1. Introduction 
 
We reconsider the merger paradox and externalities, in other words, the profitability of a 
merger, in a network product market, where we observe network externalities and 
compatibilities (interoperability and interconnectivity) between products and services.1 
In particular, since the 1990s, waves of global mergers and acquisitions have been 
observed in various industries, including telecommunications, internet businesses, 
banking, airlines, and railways. These industries are commonly characterized as 
network product markets. The characteristics imply that mergers and acquisitions in 
these industries may be profitable for the participants. 
Theoretically, however, horizontal mergers are not profitable for insiders 
(participant firms), whereas they are for outsiders (nonparticipant firms). In a seminal 
paper, Salant et al. (1983) show that a merger in Cournot oligopoly is unprofitable 
unless at least 80% of the firms in the industry participate. In Cournot oligopolistic 
competition, where strategic substitutionary relationship between the firms arises, the 
contraction of the outputs of the insider firms as a result of a merger increases the 
                                                  
1  Gugler and Szücs (2016) empirically analyze the externalities of mergers and 
demonstrate that the return on assets of rival firms (outsiders) increases significantly 
after a merger. 
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outputs of the outsider firms. As a result, although the prices increase, the insider firms 
lose, whereas the outsider firms gain; i.e., the merger paradox emerges. 
As this 80% threshold is too high to be achievable in reality, researchers have 
sought several ways out of the merger paradox. 2  For example, introducing 
merger-related efficiencies occurring through scale economies, such as cost saving 
synergies, Perry and Poster (1985) consider incentives to merge in the context of 
Cournot quantity-setting oligopoly in a homogeneous product market. Assuming 
Bertrand price-setting competition in a horizontally differentiated product market, 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) demonstrate that mergers of any size are beneficial 
when the assumption of strategic complements holds between the firms in the case of 
the price-setting game. Further, based on general demand and cost functions, Farrell and 
Shapiro (1990) consider horizontal mergers in the case of Cournot oligopoly in a 
homogeneous product market. Assuming efficiencies created by scale economies or 
learning in the general model, they show the condition for lowering the prices and the 
effect on external welfare, which is the merger and premerger difference between the 
total surplus net of the profits of the insiders. 
In the same line of literature, Faulí-Oller (1997) develops a model includes that 
                                                  
2 Levin (1990) shows that there is a 50% threshold under some conditions. 
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builds on Salant et al. (1983) and Cheung (1992) and demonstrates that the profitability 
of a merger depends on the degree of the concavity of demand. That is, if the market 
share is smaller than a certain value determined by the degree of the concavity of 
demand, any merger is unprofitable.3 
The following literature considers other ways out of the merger paradox. Creane and 
Davidson (2004) and Sawler (2005) deal with a parent holding company and 
multidivisional firms in a merger and assume that the parent holding company 
determines the managerial decision-incentives of the multidivisional firms. In this case, 
they show that mergers are profitable for the insider (multidivisional) firms, but 
unprofitable for the outsider firms, given Cournot quantity-setting games. Further, 
Miyagiwa and Wan (2016) consider the merger paradox in the presence of R&D 
investments. Dong, Guo, Aian, and Wang (2016) show that the merger paradox is 
mitigated when capacity constraints are considered. 
   In summary, to resolve the merger paradox, researchers who have developed the 
previous theoretical models—with exception of Creane and Davidson (2004) and 
Sawler (2005)—assume that there are merger-related efficiencies resulting from scale 
economies, synergies, and externalities on the supply side. However, in this paper, to 
                                                  
3 Hennessy (2000) also considers that the profitability of a merger depends on the 
properties of the demand function. 
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consider the merger paradox in a network product market, we focus on the efficiency of 
merger-related network synergies on the demand side. That is, as shown below, we 
assume that the degree of compatibility between the insiders’ products is larger than that 
of the outsider firms. 
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we develop a horizontally 
differentiated three-firm model and examine the case of noncooperative Cournot 
competition (i.e., the premerger case) and then the merger case. In Section 3, to consider 
the merger paradox and externalities, we examine the effect of a merger on outputs and 
then on profits. We demonstrate whether the merger paradox arises in the presence of 
merger-related network synergies. In Section 4, we conclude the paper. In the Appendix, 
we examine the cases of non-network externalities and a homogeneous product market. 
 
 
2. A Horizontally Differentiated Three-Firm Model with Network Externalities 
 
2.1 Preliminary 
We develop a three-firm  kji ,,  model in a network product market, where each firm 
provides a single, horizontally differentiated product with a network externality. 
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Applying the frameworks of Economides (1996) and Häckner (2000), we assume the 
following linear inverse demand function for firm i’s product: 
),( eiiii SNQqAp                                   (1) 
where kji qqQ   is the sum of the rival firms’ output, A  is the intrinsic market 
size, iq  is the output of firm i, and  1,0  is the degree of product substitutability. 
Further, )( eiSN  represents a network externality function, where 
e
iS  is the expected 
network size of firm i’s product. We assume a linear network externality function, i.e., 
  ,eiei nSSN   where  1,0n  represents the degree of the network externality. The 
expected network size of product i is given by: 
,eih
e
i
e
i QqS    ,, MCh                                  (2) 
where ek
e
j
e
i qqQ   is the sum of the rival firms’ expected outputs,  1,0h  is the 
degree of product i’s compatibility (interoperability and interconnectivity) with the 
other firms’ product –i, subscript C denotes the case of noncooperative Cournot 
competition (i.e., the premerger case), and subscript M denotes the merger case. 
In employing the concept of a fulfilled expectation, we assume that consumers form 
expectations for network sizes before firms male their output decisions (see Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985; Economides, 1996). Thus, when determining their outputs, the expected 
network sizes are given for the firms. 
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For the subsequent analysis, we make the following important assumptions. 
 
Assumptions 
(i) 01   where .CM    
(ii) .n  
 
Assumption (i) states that the degree of compatibility between the participant 
insiders’ products in the case of a merger case is larger than that in the premerger case 
(or that of a nonparticipant outsider). This represents the efficiency of merger-related 
network synergies on the demand side.4 If this effect is sufficiently large, as shown 
below, it is possible to increase the outputs of the insider compared with the premerger 
situation. Assumption (ii) involves a strong network externality. If this assumption did 
not apply, i.e., if ,n  irrespective of the degree of compatibility between the 
products, we would have the same results as yielded by the previous research analyzing 
horizontal mergers in the case of Cournot oligopoly. 
                                                  
4 In this paper, we do not examine the endogenous decision regarding the degree of 
compatibility in the case of a merger. Toshimitsu (2017) demonstrates that there is a 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium where collusive firms (or insiders) decide to 
provide perfectly compatible products (i.e., 1M ) to maximize their joint profits. 
Further, we assume that there are nil or negligible costs involved in increasing the 
degree of compatibility among the products of the insiders in the case of a merger. 
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   Further, to simplify the analysis, we assume that production costs are zero. We 
readily observe low and even negligible marginal running costs in telecommunications 
and internet businesses. 
 
2.2 Premerger: noncooperative Cournot competition 
We consider the initial situation (i.e., premerger), where three firms compete on 
quantities à la Cournot in the market. Based on equation (1), the profit function of firm i 
is given by: 
  .)( ieiiii qSNQqA                                 (3) 
The first-order condition of profit maximization is: 
.0)(2 


e
iiiii
i
i SNQqAqp
q
                     (4) 
At a fulfilled expectation, i.e., ,i
e
i qq   ,jej qq   and ,kek qq   based on equations (2) 
and (4), we obtain: 
.0)()2(  iCi QnqnA                              (5) 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., ,Ckji qqqq   we derive the following 
fulfilled expectation Cournot equilibrium. 
.
)(22 C
C nn
Aq                                     (6) 
As it holds that ,CC qp   based on equation (4), the profit in the premerger case is 
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expressed as   .2CC q  
 
2.3 Horizontal merger 
We consider the case of a horizontal merger, where a merger takes place between two 
firms  ji,  in the market. Thus, we can interpret this to indicate that the merger 
company is composed of two divisional firms. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is an insider (I), providing two 
products  ji,  and an outsider (O), providing one product k . The joint profit of the 
insider in the merger case can be expressed as: 
    .)()( jejjjieiii
jiM
qSNQqAqSNQqA 

 

          (7) 
The profit of the outsider is given by: 
  .)( kekkkO qSNQqA                               (8) 
   Based on equations (7) and (8), the first-order conditions for the insider and outsider 
firms, respectively, are given by: 
,0)(22 
 e
ikjijii
i
M SNqqqAqqp
q
           (9) 
,0)(2 


e
kkkkk
k
O SNQqAqp
q
                  (10) 
where we can obtain the first-order conditions in a similar manner to equation (9) with 
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respect to product j. 
At a fulfilled expectation, i.e., ,i
e
i qq   ,jej qq   and ,kek qq   in view of 
equations (2), (9), and (10), we have the following equations: 
,0)()2()2(  kCjMi qnqnqnA                 (11) 
.0)()2(  kCk QnqnA                            (12) 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., Iji qqq   and ,Ok qq   equations (11) and 
(12) can be rewritten as: 
     ,022  OCIM qnqnnA                   (13) 
    .022  ICO qnqnA                            (14) 
Thus, we derive the following fulfilled expectation equilibrium in the merger case (M). 
,)(2 A
D
nnq CI
                                   (15) 
  ,)(2 A
D
nnnq CO
                          (16) 
where        .02222 2  CM nnnnD   
Based on equations (15) and (16), we derive the following relationship: 
.)()(  nqq OI                                 (17) 
where n  denotes the net degree of network compatibilities. Equation (17) shows that, 
if the net degree of network compatibilities is larger (smaller) than the degree of product 
substitutability, the per unit output of the insider is larger (smaller) than that of the 
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outsider. That is, as in previous models without network externalities, if the network 
externality is zero, i.e., 0n  (or the net degree of compatibilities is zero, i.e., 0 ), 
a merger reduces the outputs but increases the prices of the insider compared with those 
of the outsider. However, if ,n  then the merger increases the outputs and prices 
of the insider compared with those of the outsider. Because it holds that    II qp  1  
and ,OO qp   the unit profit of the insider is larger than that of the outsider: 
     .1 22 OOII qq    
In general, with respect to the profits, we obtain the following relationship: 
     .0)(211)(   nnn COI      (18) 
Thus, if ,n  it holds that .OI    Further, even with ,n  it is possible for 
the unit profit of the insider is possible to be larger than that of the outsider. That is, 
equation (18) can be rewritten as follows: 
      ,0)(,,1)(  nCMIOCIOOI   
where       01221  IO  and   .1
11,,
C
M
CMIO 
 
  
Thus, if   ,0,,   CMIO  e.g., ,01  CM   it holds that .OI    Conversely, 
if   ,0,,   CMIO  e.g., ,CM    we derive the following relationship: 
  ,)(,,)( nCMIOOI    
where        .0,,1,, 
 

CMIOC
IO
CMIO  
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3. Merger Paradox and Externalities 
 
3.1 The effect on output 
With respect to the per unit output of the insider and of the outsider in the merger case, 
compared with the premerger case, we derive the following Lemma 1, based on 
equations (6), (15), and (16): 
 
Lemma 1 
(i) .)()(  nqq CI  
(ii)    .0)()(  nnqq CCO   
 
Suppose that the degree of the network externality is zero, i.e., .0n  It holds that 
CI qq   and .CO qq   Without network externalities, as is well known in the case of 
Cournot oligopoly in a homogeneous product market, the per unit output of the insider 
decreases, whereas that of the outsider increases, compared with the premerger 
situation. 
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Now, we consider the effect of the merger on outputs in the presence of network 
externalities. With respect to equation (5), which determines the fulfilled expectation 
equilibrium in the noncooperative Cournot competition, i.e., the premerger situation, we 
assume that the outputs of firms i and j are symmetrical and produced by the insider, 
whereas the output of firm k is that of the outsider, 
CIji qqq   and .COk qq   In this 
case, we derive the following reaction functions: 
,
)(2)(2 CC OC
C
C
I qnn
n
nn
Aq 

 
               (19.1) 
  .
2
2
2 CI
C
O qn
n
n
Aq
C 

                             (19.2) 
Similarly, based on equations (13) and (14), the following reaction functions can be 
derived: 
,
)2(2)2(2 OM
C
M
I qnn
n
nn
Aq 

 
             (20.1) 
  .
2
2
2 I
C
O qn
n
n
Aq 

                               (20.2) 
The reaction functions in equations (19.2) and (20.2) are the same. The position of 
firm k in the premerger case is the same as that of the outsider in the merger case. Thus, 
if ,)(  Cn  then the reaction curve is upward (downward) sloping. 
For the first terms on the right-hand sides of equations (19.1) and (20.1), we obtain 
the following relationship: 
.)(
)2(2
)(
)(2
 nnn
A
nn
A
MC
  
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Further, the reaction curve of the insider is upward (downward) sloping if .)(  Cn  
Thus, we have the following four cases: 
Case 1: , Cn  where the slope of the reaction functions is upward. This implies 
the existence of strategic complements. See Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
(a) If ,n  the reaction curve of the insider shifts up compared with the 
premerger case. As a result, the outputs of the insider and outsider increase compared 
with the premerger case. 
(b) If ,n  the reaction curve of the insider shifts down compared with the 
premerger case. As a result, the outputs of the insider and outsider decrease compared 
with the premerger case. 
   Case 2: , Cn  where the slope of the reaction curves is downward. This implies 
the existence of strategic substitutes. See Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
   (a) If ,n  the reaction curve of the insider shifts up compared with the 
premerger case. As a result, the output of the insider increases, whereas that of the 
outsider decreases, compared with the premerger case. 
(b) If ,n  the reaction curve of the insider shifts down compared with the 
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premerger case. As a result, the output of the insider decreases, whereas that of the 
outsider increases, compared with the premerger case. As discussed above, this case is 
identical to the case without a network externality. That is, the merger paradox and 
externalities arise. 
   As will be examined below, in terms of the effect on the per unit profit of the insider, 
irrespective of the slope of the reaction functions (i.e.,  )(Cn ), if ,n  then 
not only the output of the insider increases, but also the per unit profit increases. This is 
because an increase in the degree of network compatibilities resulting from the merger 
positively affects the output and profit of the insider. Accordingly, in the following 
analysis, we define )(n  as the merger-related network efficient (inefficient) 
synergies. 
 
3.2 Loss or gain from the merger 
To examine the per unit profit of the insider and that of the outsider in the merger case 
compared with the premerger case, we define the following:  ,2 CIM    
,COO    where    ,1 2II q     ,2OO q  and   .2CC q  
Taking equations (6), (15), and (16), we have the following Lemma 2:5 
                                                  
5 See the Appendix, where we consider the cases of non-network externalities, i.e., 
,0n  and a homogeneous product, i.e., .1  
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Lemma 2 
(i)            .0)(222211 )(0)(     nnnnnn CCCIM  
(ii)    .0)(0)(  nn CO   
 
First, we consider the case of strategic complements, i.e., . Cn  
If ,n  i.e., ,  CCM nnn  the merger increases the profits of the 
insider and of the outsider compared with the premerger case. As in Case 1.a, the 
outputs and prices of the insider and outsider increase because of the merger-related 
network efficient synergies under the strategic complementary relationship. Thus, both 
the insider and outsider gain from the merger. In other words, not only does the merger 
paradox not arise, but also a positive merger externality does. 
If ,n  i.e., ,  CMC nnn  then merger-related network inefficient 
synergies arise under a strategic complementary relationship, i.e., Case 1.b. In this case, 
the merger decreases the profit of the outsider compared with the premerger situation. 
This case involves a negative merger externality. Further, the effect on the per unit profit 
of the insider is ambiguous. That is, in view of Lemma 1, the merger decreases the 
output, but it can increase the price, i.e.,   ,1 II qp   compared with those in the 
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premerger case. That is, if ,0 ICI qqq  it holds that .CI pp   In this case, it is 
possible to increase the per unit profit of the insider compared with that in the 
premerger case. For example, see Case 1 in the numerical examples in Table 1. 
Second, we consider the case of strategic substitutes, i.e. . Cn  
If ,n  i.e., ,CCM nnn    the merger increases the unit profit of 
the insider, whereas it decreases that of the outsider, compared with the premerger case. 
As in Case 2.a, the reaction curve of the insider shifts up compared with the premerger 
case. As a result, although the outputs and prices of the insider increase, those of the 
outsider decrease, compared with the premerger case. Thus, the insider gains from 
merger, whereas the outsider loses. In other words, the merger paradox does not arise, 
but a negative merger externality does. 
If ,n  i.e., MC nn    and ,Cn  then merger-related network 
inefficient synergies arise under a strategic substitutionary relationship, i.e., Case 2.b. In 
this case, the reaction curve of the insider shifts down compared with the premerger 
case. As a result, because the output and price of the outsider increase, its profit always 
increases. In other words, this case involves a positive merger externality. However, as 
mentioned above, the effect on the unit profit of the insider is ambiguous. That is, 
although the outputs decrease, it is possible that the prices are possible to increase. 
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Cases 2 and 4 in the numerical examples in Table 1 provide examples of the unit profit 
of an insider increasing. On the other hand, the merger paradox arises in Case 3. This is 
because the net degree of compatibilities in Case 4 is larger than in Case 3, i.e., 
.02.06.0 34   In other words, the absolute value of the merger-related network 
inefficient synergies in Case 4 is smaller than that in Case 3. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
We summarize the analysis above as the following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 
(1) In the presence of merger-related network efficient synergies, i.e., ,n  the 
merger paradox does not necessarily arise. Further, if the degree of the outsider’s 
network compatibility is larger (smaller) than that of product substitutability, i.e., 
,)(  Cn  then the outsider gains (losses) from the merger; i.e., a positive (negative) 
merger externality arises. 
(2) In the presence of merger-related network inefficient synergies, i.e., ,n  it is 
possible for the merger paradox to arise. Further, if the degree of the outsider’s network 
compatibility is larger (smaller) than that of product substitutability, i.e., ,)(  Cn  
then the outsider loses (gains) from the merger, i.e., a negative (positive) merger 
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externality arises. 
 
In particular, Proposition (2) implies that the presence of a merger-related network 
compatibility, even though it is inefficient, mitigates the loss from the merger. Further, 
when merger-related network efficient synergies exist and the degree of the outsider’s 
network compatibility is sufficiently large, the total outputs are larger in the merger case 
than in the premerger case. Accordingly, this result implies that the merger increases 
consumer surplus and thus social surplus, compared with the premerger case. Therefore, 
we note, although we do not discuss, antitrust issues as the focus of this paper, that 
mergers in such a case should be allowed by antitrust authorities. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Focusing on the role of merger-related network compatibility, which induces synergies 
on the demand side, we have reconsidered the profitability of mergers in the case of a 
network externality. In particular, we have found that the merger paradox never arises in 
the presence of merger-related network efficient synergies, where the net degree of 
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network compatibilities is larger than the degree of product substitutability. Further, 
even in the case of merger-related network inefficient synergies, the merger paradox 
does not necessarily arise. 
   We appreciate that our model is based on specific assumptions, e.g., a three-firm 
model, with linear functions and limited parameters. In future research, it would be 
useful to relax these assumptions to analyze more general cases. Our results 
demonstrated in the model are related to mergers and competition policies in network 
industries, including, but not limited to, telecommunications and internet businesses. We 
consider that, if the merger-related network efficient synergies can be evaluated, a 
proposed merger should be allowed by antitrust authorities because the consumer 
surplus, as well as the producer surplus, increases as a result of the merger compared 
with the premerger case. Thus, in future, we intend to examine merger policy in the 
presence of network compatibility. 
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Appendix 
1. The case of non-network externalities 
Using Lemma 2, we obtain as follows: 
(i) ,)()( #   CI  where .2
1555.0#  6 
(ii) .CO    
   The above results are well established in the previous literature. For (i), the degree 
of product differentiation is sufficiently large (small), i.e., 0  ,1  so that a merger 
increases (decreases) the unit profit of the insider compared with the premerger case. As 
is well known in the case of a homogeneous product market, i.e., where ,1  a 
merger decreases the unit profit of the insider; i.e., the merger paradox arises. On the 
other hand, for (ii), a merger increases the profit of the outsider compared with the 
premerger case; i.e., a positive merger externality arises. 
 
                                                  
6     ,01,0#   IC  where       .2111  IC  the 
continuous function  IC  has the following properties: 
(i)   ,0lim 0   IC      ,0322lim 1   IC   
(ii)   0 IC  for ,555.00     0 IC  for ,555.0  and   0 IC  for 
.1555.0    
(iii) 
  0 

d
d IC  for ,366.00      0 

d
d IC  for ,366.0  and   0 

d
d IC  
for .1366.0     
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2. The case of a homogeneous product market with a network externality 
Based on Lemma 2, when ,1  we obtain the following relationships: 
(i)            .0)(1211214120)(  nnnn CCM   
(ii)    .0)(110)(  nn CO   
With respect to the level of compatibility in the merger and premerger cases, we 
assume that ,1M  and ,0C  and, thus, .1  In the premerger case, the firms 
provide incompatible products, whereas, in the case of a merger, the insider provides the 
perfectly compatible products and the outsider provides the incompatible one. The 
above relations can be rewritten as: 
(i)         .59.0
22
2232)(0)(22322210)( 
 nnnM  
(ii)   ,010  nO  
where .01  n  
   Therefore, we have the following results: if the degree of the network externality is 
sufficiently large, i.e., ,59.0n  then the merger is profitable for the insider and 
outsider firms. 
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Figure 1 
Case 1  Cn  (Strategic Complements) 
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Figure 2 
Case 2  Cn  (Strategic Substitutes) 
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(b) :n  CI qq   and CO qq   
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Table 1: Numerical examples where  n  
Case 1: 1.0  and 02.0  then n02.01.0   and 1.09.0  n  
0003.008.018.0 2  MM nnH  
  
2
1)(0)(02.01.02.01.0  nnnH OO   
Case 2: 1.0  and 6.0  then n6.01.0   and 1.09.0  n   
0055.026.1004.0 2  MM nnH  
  
6
11.006.01.02.01.0  nnnH OO   
Case 3: 4.0  and 02.0  then n02.04.0   and 4.06.0  n   
   0019.001.02  MM nnH   
   002.04.02.04.0  OO nnH    
Case 4: 4.0  and 6.0  then n6.04.0   and 4.06.0  n  
   0039.001.02  MM nnH   
   06.04.02.04.0  OO nnH   
 
Note 
We assume that 2.0C  and either 22.0M  or .8.0M  
It holds that ,1   n  from Assumptions (ii) and (iii). 
            .222211,,;   nnnnnnnH CCCM  
    .,,;  nnnH CCO   
 
